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DRAFT _ The Subtlety of Language in the Art of War

May 15th, 2012

[Please note: this is currently with my editor and is in DRAFT format, feel free to read but expect typos - final version should be available shortly]

Been reading up on Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War”?  If not, you had better move the book to the top of the weekend reading list- the next ten years of your career might depend on it.

It is (for those who have not read it) one of the world’s oldest and most respected texts on military strategy. First translated into French in 1772, it is on the reading list of many who seek competitive advantage (including the U.S. Marines and the CIA). Beyond direct warfare, it’s lessons have been applied across a broad range of disciplines including sports and business.

In my reading, The Art of War is a guide to winning by doing other than your opponent does or expects you to do. Sometimes that means not treating them as an opponent at all.

Particularly interesting is the subtlety of the strategic approach Sun Tzu outlines. He emphasizes the need to exploit nuances at critical moments on the field of battle. We are in such a moment in the asset/wealth management*.

My bet is that the winners in the asset management industry over the next decade will be marked by their understanding and ability to strategically capitalise on subtle nuances**.

By focusing on the nuances, I am not suggesting that the ‘big things’ don’t matter – they definitely do. In fact, probably more so than ever. But in some ways, the big things are obvious and accounted for – strategically, they belong to the past.

At points of influx, during shifts in paradigm (as we are now without doubt experiencing), the nuances are the fulcrum points from which the future will be driven.

Given the rate of change in our industry,  if you have not done so already, there is limited time to get ‘the big things’ right simply to be on a foundation for growth. This is because your competition is on the move. Frankly, much of this should have been figured out shortly after Lehman’s lights went out (if not before).

Today’s nascent nuances are the big things of tomorrow.

How to Make Their Clients Ours -or- Let’s Deal with Middleman First?

As I have been discussing extensively in recent years, the question of client control and dis-intermediation is one of the great undercurrents of our industry. The points of influence over asset owners and their investment decisions are in flux and will increasingly contested amongst market participants.  The full outcome remains uncertain but this much  is clear:

To the extent that an asset manager and intermediary distributor/adviser are offering the same service to an end-client, they are not partners but competitors.  To the extent that they can take aspects of business from a competitor without jeopardizing the all important relationship with the end client (the one with the money), they should (ugh em, will).

In these days of shifting relationship and roles between asset management ‘manufacturers’ and ‘distributors’, let me point out a pertinent, and oh so subtle emerging nuance. So nuanced in fact, it revolves around the positioning of just one little series of words, but oh what  powerful words they are!  These words may prove to be key artillery in the art of client acquisition.

Though the tactic is attributable to Sun Tzu, it is perhaps children who are the earliest masters of the approach. For those readers with children, you know the tactic well – it goes like this.  Have you lost a flashlight, a pen, or perhaps an automobile to the subtlety of the shift in possessive case? I take what is yours by simply calling it mine. No need for a war (in the conventional sense), no need for hostility. A smooth and unchallenged conquest.  And so it goes: your car, the car, my car… as easy as that.

This shift in possession takes place  with a special twist only possible with children (and as I would argue) investment professionals. There is an asymmetrical risk/return profile. As long as the newly possessed object continues to work as it should and no maintenance is required, everything is fine but when it breaks down and needs service, then you (as the rightful owner) get it back. Car runs out of gas, my car no more.

You, dear parent (and asset management professional), are already living  in the shadow of  Sun Tzu and his Art of War.

Across the Divide

You have likely seen the campaign for BlackRock’s “Investing for the New World” that ran the last couple of months. Full page ads in the WSJ, FT and elsewhere. Direct to investor advertising. Going retail. Iconic video shoots with lots of emotion. Connecting BlackRock to the client (that is, the one with the money).

I recently watched most of an hour long  ‘interview’ between Larry Fink and another senior BlackRock colleague of his. Peppered in the conversation about the changing financial world and Larry’s insights, a wee little indication of another New World emerged.

On several occasions during the hour interview, Larry and his colleague referred to the Financial Advisers (FAs) (employed by the financial intermediaries that distribute BlackRock’s products) as “our FAs”.

As quickly as you have lost your pen to your child, has Larry (attempted) to take the sales force of an intermediary who distributes BlackRock’s products simply by calling them his own and by so doing created a tremendous point of leverage to the end clients under the FA’s guidance? Increase a sales force and loyalty by adoption? If you are an asset manager and want to maximize the powerful distribution capabilities of a large distributor while not giving up control of the end client, this could be one such tactic.

But it is not just on the main stage that these nuances are growing into something big. On a scale far below that of the global asset management behemoths, we are seeing parallel developments. Boutique asset managers are providing Registered Investment Advisers (RIA) in the U.S. (similar in approach to IFAs in many other parts of the world) with ‘investment solutions’ branded as the RIA’s own. Combining asset allocation and security selection, they are the ‘outsourced CIO’ of the high net worth investor world.

The relationship with the client is that of the RIA but for how long will it be before the asset manager begins to call the adviser its own?

An Excerpt

From the Art of War, Chapter 3: “Offensive Strategy”

Generally, in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy’s entire army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence.

Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy. Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle.

(Italics mine).

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* Though of course the stakes are inconsequential relative to war – lets’ not take ourselves too seriously here.

** The convergence of alternative and traditional and the eventual mainstreaming of alternative investments was but a nuanced spark when some of us fringe thinkers began discussing (nearly ten years ago) that its eventuality was inevitable. So it goes with ETFs and the bulk of asset management products today.

Whose Client is it Anyway?

February 22nd, 2012

Larry Fink is advising investors in general and his clients in particular to own 100% equities. Clearly the man who was instrumental in building a 3.3 trillion dollar asset manager on the foundation of bonds has become a stock guy.  Whether or not this radical asset shift is sensible is certainly debatable. But an equally interesting question  for many of us thinking through the quickly evolving nature of asset management and distribution is:

“who, exactly, are Larry’s clients?”

and, what does he know about asset allocation? Is Jan Investor, ABC Pension Fund and XYZ Foundation BlackRock’s client or that of the investment intermediary who, so graciously, made the allocation to BlackRock’s investment strategy?

Certainly the intermediaries through whom  BlackRock and every other asset manager around the globe have gathered assets (investment consultants, private banks, broker-dealers and the like) see the situation differently. They are not in a position to take Larry’s advice and move their clients into 100% equities. In fact, they are not interested in BlackRock’s  (or any other manager for that matter) opinions on asset allocation at all. In fact, they are the ones giving asset allocation advice and getting paid for it. Without the advice, what are they good for? Are they simply an introduction service for fee-hungry asset managers with 40% (+/-) margins?  How are they going to earn their fees and maintain themselves in the relationship? Ah, there’s the rub.

These intermediaries, at least in how they are used to operating, do not want Larry’s advice and asset allocation acumen – they want him to ensure that the fixed income products outperform their peers and benchmarks, that the hedge funds produce absolute returns, that the style of the equity products don’t drift…get my drift? Stay in the box Larry, we’ll let you know when we need you.

The dynamics between asset managers and the intermediaries who have been standing between them and the end-clients (read: the ‘client’ with the money) are not what they were twenty years ago. The intermediary is (was) in the driver’s seat, making asset allocation decisions, hiring and firing managers whose responsibility was narrowly defined – stick to the asset class/style for which you were hired and leave the asset allocation to us.

We have been watching this unfold for years but it has now reached the momentum point ™ (sorry Malcolm). In recent weeks, I have had repeated conversations with asset managers who tell stories about seeing the institutional consultants who once included them in searches showing up at finals presentations as competitors offering ‘implemented’ multi-asset solutions themselves. Well, well.

Ok, if no one else will say it, I will. You guys aren’t friends, really never have been. Stop pretending and just put the gloves on.  The disintermediation battle is on.

Though the frictions have clearly been developing (albeit relatively slowly), few in the industry, on either side of the trade, were terribly concerned about the evolution in the relationship between ‘manufacturing’ and ‘distribution’. Everyone was making money, markets were headed up, the asset allocation models, if not working as hoped, were at least not so apparently broken.

For many of the traditional asset managers, there were other things to worry about – being crushed by the ETFs charging from the left or picked off by the hedgies hiding in the shadows to the right. Insofar as distribution relationships go, rising tides…

But now the tides have receded. Margins are compressed. Regulation is overbearing. Clients are dissatisfied and are not as sympathetic to the manager/consultant agency problem as they once were.  Everyone is seeking a closer relationship with ‘the’ client and migrating to where the fees are. Each is seeking to control the relationship (and stay in the game). If I am being held as fiduciary, I want to get paid! It turns out (right after client-first) we all want the same thing.

Of course, this is not an entirely new situation.  Arguably it is a return to the state of the industry before there was a distinction between asset allocation and stock selection. To be an asset manager was (is) to not only buy stocks and bonds but to decide when to own one as opposed to the other. That was in the days when bank trust departments were at their peak of power…alas.

And who threw the first punch? Was it asset managers encroaching on the world of the adviser/consultant through developing products incorporating asset allocation and ’solutions’ or vice versa with ‘implemented’ consulting? Doesn’t really matter – blood has been spilled.

While this topic manifests itself in multiple ways around the world throughout client segments and geographies, perhaps the most visible implications are the growth  in ‘multi-asset/multi-manager’ on the part of what have been traditional asset managers and ‘implemented consulting’ and ’solutions’ on the part of those who, in large part, have simply been the buyer of individual asset management products. Outsourced CIO anyone?

This is a game changer – it will turn the industry on its head.  One must hope that the arrangement best suited to meet the needs of the end-clients will ultimately win out. What that model(s) looks like is being defined today.

There has been plenty of double counting  in our industry but for how much longer? At some point we will need to answer the question:  “Whose client is it anyway?”

‘active/passive’: not the same old debate…

September 27th, 2011

Beyond answering the question ‘active or passive’, investors should be asking what is the significance of the ‘active or passive’ debate for today’s quickly evolving investment landscape? Does the question still matter?

Passive means something quite different as broader asset allocation decisions are becoming more and more active. In terms of both timing and types of exposures nothing seems left to passivity – the time for ’set it and forget it’ has passed.

More significant is the integration of the passive into a broader application of active management. Asset allocation decisions are increasingly part of the manager’s charge.

Narrowly define ‘bucket products’ with ‘low tracking’ error targets, obsession with risk defined by index weightings and rigid dedication to someone else definition of a particular style are on the wane.

The indices themselves are being drawn into question – market cap weighted exchanged for fundamentally-based for instance.

Of course, the creators of those indices have their own explaining to do – does that committee at S&P who chooses the most representative 500 stocks in the U.S. have a firm grasp on reality as the guys down the hall that downgraded the country’s credit rating? Investment banks defining the index constituents with an eye on their own flows and product structuring? But I have digressed.

The importance of the question ‘active or passive?’ has evolved beyond its original scope.

If you want to identify a real and sustainable change in trends, ask yourself whether the framework for asking the questions about the status quo seem tired. If asking the same question over and over yields only a headache and opaque answers (bolstered on either side by data-mined and preordained statistics) then it is likely that the world has moved on.

Originally posited offensively by proponents of efficient markets and the indexing, the question was intended as an affront to active managers picking stocks. What underlies the significance of the debate is whether the context in which it is applied is still valid. Not whether active outperforms passive per se, but whether or not they are still reasonably considered as comparables (the question of if they were ever notwithstanding).

I don’t mean to be dismissive of an important issue; questioning whether or not a manager has the ability to outperform a more efficient market exposure vehicle (and is hence worth the fees) is an important responsibility of fiduciary intermediaries. But the system has been uniformly rigged.

Built upon the long cherished strategic asset allocation – it is the ’set it and forget it’ approach to asset allocation that the market since 2008 has sucked the confidence right out of.  Stocks and bonds are not performing like they are ’supposed to’.  The dependability of the risk/return assumptions and basic logic (in the New Normal or whatever term you are comfortable with) underlying the asset allocation are arguably tossed out.

And in the meantime, the uses of passive investment vehicles have become active in new ways.

The mandates being given to asset managers are broadening and include asset allocation decisions as well as security selection. It is part and parcel of the new (old) trend in product development at various scales: global macro, balanced, multi-asset, dynamic asset allocation, total return,… call it what you will, it is all telling of a shifting of responsibility for the bigger role of decision making in asset management products. In each case, managers are making active decisions by incorporating passive vehicles (ETFs are the case in point).

So if passive outperforms active but active is buying passive actively and being measured against a broadened passive index, are the returns active or passive? (Don’t waste your time…)

I am spending a lot of my time these days better sorting out just how these ‘products’ fit within the existent asset allocation logic.  And too, understanding the implications of the shifting relationship between the entity investing the money and the entity which guides the client decision made through use of a traditional asset allocation modeling approach. There is a lot at stake.

Mirror, mirror on the wall, is the U.S. still the fairest of them all?

August 11th, 2011

Warren Buffett’s response to the downgrading of the U.S. as a debtor was that the country is (was) not a triple A but a quadruple A. Now that is the mark of a confident man!

Buffett’s view is reflective of the one long held by most market participants – the creditworthiness of the U.S. is against which all else is compared. It is the very fulcrum point from which the global economy is levered. To move the U.S. is to destabilize the rest.

Historically, this U.S.-centric view holds that any other sovereign entity also rated as AAA is with recognition of the U.S. being the ‘corner tenant’ of the AAA office park. Implicitly, while there may be others donned with an AAA, none is as strong as that of the U.S. America, for better or worse, is the benchmark upon which all else has been compared. It is a function of not only being the world’s largest economy, biggest borrower but also the printer of the world’s reserve currency.  It is the AAA (bold, 14 pt. font) rating of the U.S. compared to the merely AAA (normal, 11 pt. font) rating of everyone else. Or, that is, it was.

The conundrum in which we now find ourselves mired is shaped by the movement of the U.S. from the comparable but unassailable benchmark upon which all else is compared. The ‘special status’ has been revoked. A week ago, the world of finance was connected to (what all but a few) thought was terra firma.

While the strong pillar holding up ‘high quality/risk free’ end of the credit rating spectrum, comparisons to the U.S. credit rating only went in one direction – there was nothing ‘less risky’. Now the U.S. and those who have been so reliant upon its multifold stability (and this means all investors) have been disjointed.

The direct impact on the U.S., (as global markets have clearly shown) is only a part of the story.  Seekers of risk must ask: ‘what is now our point of reference?’ U.S. debt instruments, whether 30 day t-bills or the 30 year bonds, have been the reference point for nearly every investment policy statement, asset allocation model and risk modeling system in the U.S., and in many instances, globally. That has now all shifted, or, more accurately, it is shifting. One question among many is what is now the ‘risk free rate’ in the bottom left hand corner of those handy efficient frontier models used the world over?

S&P’s action brings into question the very nature of the game. The reference point and assumed ‘risk free rate’ are shifting – as such, so are the field markers. If the U.S. is not that to which all else is compared and rated/ranked, than what is? (This is in part the catalyst for the rise of gold: the great shiny sovereign ancient king.)

Confidence is ultimately the only factor driving markets. It is the prime mover. In the face of rapid erosion in confidence, little else matters. The slipping confidence of market participants is largely driven by the shifting sands beneath investors’ feet.  Our collective framework for understanding just how the world works has been shaken.

American Funds and the Oscars

March 1st, 2011

It seems that American Funds, the formidable asset manager based in Los Angeles, is having a bit of an odd Oscars moment. They are winning all of the accolades but not seeing the box office sales.

In recent industry surveys and analytical pieces conducted for year end 2010 in the U.S., American Funds comes out on top of the list. They are being touted as #1 (in U.S. markets) in the areas of “consistent, dedicated to advisors, ethical and trustworthy” as ranked by advisors in a recent poll conducted by kasina (http://kasina.com/favision_new.asp). Their placement at the top of the pile is not new; they have been the show to beat for nearly two decades. They have long been the ‘go to’ suite of products for many financial advisors.

In connection with the release of the report, Lee Kowarski, a principal at kasina, stated, “It is critical for asset managers to establish a strong brand, especially in this environment where advisors are concentrating 64.8% of their assets under management with their top three providers…[w]e have observed that a firm’s score on the FA Vision Brand Index is positively correlated with customer advocacy (the likelihood that a customer will recommend the firm), which is a key predictor of flows.”

According to kasina’s poll, American Funds has an industry crushing “FA Vision Brand Index” score of 25.06, – three times higher than Vanguard (8.58), the next highest in the ranking of advisors’ opinions. Simple math (and the correlations that kasina suggest) tell us that American Funds would be flush with inflows; people would be lining up at the red carpet to see them and casting votes with their wallets thrown open.

Nope. Beyond all the well wishes and back patting, things don’t look so good. American Funds are seeing record outflows. They are in fact hemorrhaging and have been since 2008. According to data compiled from Morningstar Direct, they have lost $52,603,000,000 (that is billions) over the twelve months ended January 31 2011 in their U.S. domiciled funds. In 2010, they lost basically what Vanguard took in. Want to guess what business looks like across Europe and in Asia?

Credible arguments for the losses have come to American Funds’ defenses. Some industry pundits argue that the flows are, on a percentage basis, not so significant given the firm’s total AuM. Others have pointed out that the outflows are reportedly concentrated in a couple of distribution channels and therefore not indicative of broader trends. Others suggest that they are not particularly strong in bonds and therefore were victim to their predominantly equity driven business during the flight to quality. Others point out that performance has struggled short term and led to redemptions. Each of these points are more or less spot on but I am not buying the broader argument that this is a momentary lapse for the company. It is the indication of a longer running problem.

For certain, they are a huge company (and in fact part of the larger Capital Group) and not going to disappear overnight by any means. Yet, it is tough to see their growth drivers in the current environment. They have, in recent months, introduced a few new products – something that has not happened in years. But perhaps the indication of a change too late? They have recently been beaten by faster, leaner and/or more innovative shops. As the purveyors of the ‘core’, they have been standing in the middle of the road too long and have failed to keep up with key distribution and product trends. When you stand in the middle of the road too long, you get run over.

I think they better figure out what is really going on instead of listening to people talking about just how lovely their garments are.*

* The “Last Emperor” won 9 Oscars in 1988 and grossed $43,984,230. The emperor with the new clothes in the famous children story was misinformed and took some bad advice.

Stuck in the Box: Michael Lipper and Don Philips

February 8th, 2011

Last month, in my article for Citywire Global, I discussed recent blog posts written by Michael Lipper. In summary, I commented on Mr. Lipper’s self-reflection and recognition of mistakes made regarding the rigid categorization of managers & funds. In an attempt to redeem his missteps, he suggests a ‘new’ methodology that, unfortunately, falls short of the mark.

In response to his mea culpa and proposed way forward, my article discusses the oddity of his position particularly given that he built and later sold a globally-recognized business formed on the logic and methodology he is now renouncing. It is a categorization methodology that continues to have a huge impact on the developments of the asset management industry and the mindset/decision making processes of investors.

Which brings me to Don Philips and the article he published this morning on the Morningstar website. Minus the emotional elements and recognition of responsibility, the article comes from a perspective that is remarkably similar in essence to Michael Lipper’s but with differing motivations and conclusions. Further, Mr. Philips comes to the topic not from introspection but from an analysis of what he sees as barbarians at the gate: what he terms as ‘indexing extremists’.

It is a great irony of course that these topics are emerging now given the co-central role that Mssrs. Lipper and Philips have played in the development of the industry over the last 30+ years and in particular the ‘behind the scenes’ impact on the active/passive debate. They are now (with Mr. Lipper more quickly than Mr. Philips) coming to terms with the seeds they themselves have sown.

Taking a slightly different angle and offsetting blame to an extreme faction who have hijacked an otherwise rational discussion, Mr. Philips’ article discusses the implications of ‘Indexing Extremists’ who, by means of bad mouthing active management, have painted it as an atrocity unleashed on humanity. Mr. Philips eloquently writes:

“In the 1980s and 1990s, the index community was the voice of reason in the investment debate. Today, however, credible voices within the index community are too often drowned out by a vocal fringe that does more to polarize than to advance the investment discussion. [...] At some point, however, many index fans went from making the honest and helpful argument that indexing is good to making the hyperbolic and divisive case that anything other than indexing was not only bad, but also morally suspect.”

Like Mr. Lipper’s categorization methodologies and tools, the style boxes engineered by Mr. Philips (with perhaps greater efficacy) are of course responsible for providing much of the artillery that forced asset managers into increasingly narrower bands of categories and gave way to the proliferation of index-linked products and the push away from active management. This in turn sparked interested in ’style analysis’ in general, its merciless prescriptive integration into asset allocation programs and the rise of prominence in ETFs and hedge funds alike (but this is a blog, not a book so I’ll stop there with the history).

Unlike Mr. Lipper, Mr. Philips has not yet moved fully down the path of self-reflection and contrition for his actions. Alas, he has made the right first steps, I think he is on his way to a Lipperesque mea culpa but it will take a few years. For now, while he is a major shareholder and MD of Morningstar, we will blame it on the ‘extremists’ while the ‘voice of reason’ still controls the last vestige of the old guard. Of course, if we moved completely away from active management, who would buy the stars?

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The full Citywire article (with links to Mr. Lipper’s blogs) can be found here: http://citywire.co.uk/global/fund-veterans-guilty-plea-knocked-me-out-of-my-chair/a457232/full

Michael Philips article can be found here: http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=369374

To get to the root of the topic, one must understand Sharpe and his 1992 “order from chaos” paper that sets the stage for ’style analysis’ and subsequent developments in the industry. I have written extensively on these topics – articles discussing “Sharpe” and “style” can be found through the “Commentary” section on this site.

If you have other ideas, please share.

twitter

January 26th, 2011

Twitter just sent me an email saying that they have missed me.  The email asked – “Curious to know what you’re missing on Twitter right now?” I checked, turns out, not much at all.

‘Fund Forum’ Panel Discussion – What Analysts are Looking for from Asset Managers Post Crisis

October 13th, 2010

I will be leading a panel discussion with three senior manager research analysts at the Fund Forum in Boston on November 1st.  We will be discussing ‘post crisis’ evolution of fund/manager selection and what analysts are looking for from asset managers now.  A taste of the topics to be covered follows:

___

Through the market turmoil and rapid evolution in the asset management industry over the last several years, one thing remains crystal clear. Decisions about the buying and selling of investment product are increasingly concentrated in the hands of manager research analysts.

Collectively, the global group of analysts who work within broker/ dealers, banks, RIAs, institutional consulting firms and other financial intermediaries are arguably the key client group for asset managers. Their opinions drive a sizable (and growing) percentage of the overall worldwide flows into and out of funds.

Given changes in regulatory environments, a fiercely competition landscape and the increased complexity of the investment environment, professional buyers using a highly sophisticated institutional selection process will eventually be the norm worldwide. Successful asset managers are structuring their organizations to prepare and capitalize on this development.

The strengthening role of the analyst is driving asset managers to reevaluate their approach to selling and supporting their products. Asset managers are using robust strategies for liaising with analysts and ensuring their needs are met.

Well-equipped and ultimately successful asset management firms understand the selection process and the mindset of the analysts who are responsible for driving a major portion of worldwide flows. They understand that developing strong relationships with analyst teams is a tremendous leverage point for their business.

These managers provide information and support that goes well beyond a factsheet and market commentary. They anticipate the need to support the analyst during shifting market phases and through changes in the investment product. They recognize that presenting to an analyst is not a sales pitch but a dialogue with a knowledgeable counterpart who a tremendous level of information at his or her fingertips.

Such managers recognize the particular challenges of the analysts’ job and seek to alleviate some of the pressure points through timely flows of information, with honesty and transparency.

Analysts tend to be a highly skeptical buyer group who work within an environment that is performance-driven, risk adverse and highly regulated – a complicated combination. Analysts don’t take kindly to being given the ‘hard sell’. They follow a structured decision making process and, in order to do so, need to have access to clear and concise sources of information about the investment product in view.

There are, as most recognize, already far more investment products available then are needed. Nonetheless, worldwide product proliferation is at an all time high. Further, the growing complexity of a new generation of products requires analysts perform sophisticated and careful analysis to get comfortable enough to render an opinion.

The converging of aspects of what once were called ‘alternative’ and ‘traditional’ are leading to an evolved playing field for managers and analysts alike. Complicating manners further, the commonly used approach to asset allocation and the theoretically tenets upon which it is based are being eroded at a rapid rate.

At the same time, the strength of ETFs, structured products, and a variety of other wrappers has pushed the competitive landscape for asset managers to new levels.

‘Post-crisis’, fund analysts are demanding even more from asset managers. The products they are interested in buying display attributes distinguishing them from successful products of the past. Innovative managers who can prove that they have the sustainable skills to develop and manage these products and service the sophisticated needs of analysts stand to gain; others will be left behind.

More information on the event and the panelists can be found at:

(http://www.icbi-events.com/fundsusa)

Green Day on Broadway

July 9th, 2010

The influence of alternative ideas and approaches constantly redirect and reinvent the mainstream. Innovations first introduced outside of the mainstream and, in many cases, defined as counter to it, become broadly adopted and eventually accepted as mainstream themselves.

This is not only the case in the asset management industry – it is a broad social phenomena. Take for example the music band ‘Green Day’.  Does it make sense to call their music ‘alternative’ anymore? Though once deemed a punk band, against the grain and counter to the mainstream, they are now a defining aspect of the core of contemporary music. Their music is certainly unique. It is precisely this factor that makes it so influential to the mainstream. It is not simply absorbed but has a strong and lasting impact on what the mainstream is. The tourists lined up to see the Broadway show in New York based on the band’s music certainly suggest this.*

When ideas have pragmatic and commercial value, they take root and spread. What works best, eventually works for most. If there is a true innovation that helps to produce better results, provide more predictability and is commercially valuable, it will eventually be adopted broadly. Though, it must be stated, such innovations quite often come to market in versions “modified for general use” and often on a considerable time lag. Watering-down an original investment idea and stripping it of its pragmatic value is a real risk but not a necessity. It is  crucial to keep both these points  in perspective.

And while we speak extensively about the evolving nature of the mainstream areas of investing due to the influx of new investment ideas and demands from investors, those asset classes and strategies that had been regarded as alternative over the last decade have also matured and evolved themselves. They are not the same as they were ‘pre-most-recent-crisis’ much less ten years ago. New alternative areas of investment and techniques are being developed. The more mature, transparent and easily implementable alternative strategies are readily being adapted for the mainstream. It demonstrates the importance of innovation to our industry – particularly during periods of market flux.

There are a complex group of factors driving this “main-streaming”: a combination of both pulls and pushes from traditional and alternative asset management industry players. Some main drivers include:

1. Direct adaptation of aspects of what had been considered alternative investment instruments and approaches into the mainstream (although not necessarily by the original purveyors thereof),

2. M&A and new product development across the ‘traditional’ and ‘alternative’ divide,

3. Greater attention to and demands for high levels of transparency and categorization within the alternatives industry itself. As the industry matures, risk control and monitoring are becoming primary concerns. The individual strategies that sought to be heterogeneous (unique) and thereby undefinable, get brought together as a group of “like” peers making a homogeneous category. In a strange logical twist, they become less alternative by virtue of being identified and categorized as alternative.

The last point is particularly remarkable. I have watched with great interest the development of various categories for hedge funds – from about seven to twenty-five to a hundred, not entirely different than the climax of “hyper style boxing” of managers in the 1990s-2000s that took place (primarily) in the U.S.

Breaking strategies down prescriptively into geographic and market cap ranges will be the downfall of many good managers regardless of the vehicle in which their strategy is made available to investors.

Of course, categorization starts with the intention of being descriptive. It seeks to answer the questions “what is there and what does it do?” But unlike with scientists developing names and categories for physical elements, flora and fauna, asset management is a  human endeavor. In looking at a broad range of managers and seeking to identify common characteristics, analysts and consultants influence the activities of the managers. Not recognized by many players in the space, this process effectively pushes such strategies towards the mainstream through providing higher levels of information and transparency. The managers must keep moving to redefine themselves and stay innovative and/or to fit within the assigned boxes that have been created through an asset allocation process. (I have written extensively about this elsewhere – see the article directly before this one for instance and articles on ‘Sharpe and style’).

There will always be an alternative. I am not suggesting that the investment world has regressed to a homogeneous lump and that there are not investors doing things differently. In fact, let’s hope that in asset management (and in every other field of human endeavor) we have constant innovation. Without innovation and new ideas, our lives would be pretty boring. The point is that the horizon and borders are expanding and become redefined. Over the last ten years, many of the approaches and strategies to investing that were only available to a very limited group of investors have grown rapidly in both popularity and accessibility. Certain asset classes (commodities, emerging markets debt, real estate) in various forms take a central role. Certain strategies (long/short, global macro, increasing benchmark unconstrained and absolute return oriented) have also become of interest to a broader range of investors. So has the way we think about investing – not losing money (not just relative to an index) makes a lot of sense, as does owning assets other than stocks and bonds. Investment vehicles have become more efficient in delivering them (UCITs in particular).

There are, and always will be, investment strategies and underlying instruments that are esoteric and do not fit into mainstream investment categories – we must increasingly look further to the horizon to find such alternatives. Now, given the ability to offer many strategies previously unavailable in traditional vehicles through UCITs funds, there is a growing gray area of what is and is not “mainstream-able”. Many strategies may be capacity constrained or illiquid. Their risk/reward profiles may be inappropriate. They may be too complex for sales people or investment consultants to explain. Or, and this is quite often the case, the guy who has an “edge” does not want it publicly broadcast and thereby watering down his ability to generate alpha. The manager can charge 2/20 (or the like) to a small group of like-minded investors who are happy to trade a lack of transparency, liquidity and a part of the return for exceptional talent and returns.  But exceptional is the exception.

*http://www.greenday.com/site/american_idiot.php (not a fan of musicals myself, I have not seen it).

one from the sandbox

April 27th, 2010

These days, I spend a lot of my free time in playgrounds. My son is now 20 month old. His commitment to play is fervent.

This weekend, in one of the ubiquitous Central Park playgrounds,  I sat on the edge of the sandbox with my feet planted in the sand. It is easy to return to being a child in mind while watching children play – particularly those of the age just gaining a sense of self and what relationships with others entail.

While I watched, floating in and out of my adult consciousness, the ‘work’ part of my brain (which I associate with some level of seriousness and the motive to profit) began to find interest in his actions. I have no intention of wresting my son from his childhood (oh the eager words of Peter Pan – “I want always to be a boy, and have fun.”) nor of arbitrarily guiding him to a career in which he must wear a tie,  but I could not help but ‘project’ some semblance of creative profit seeking to his actions.

My son will be an exceptional investor. He has some of the key the qualities of the exceptional investors I have known through the years. The first is an acute sense of timing, the second is an uncanny ability to find a willing and less savvy trading partner.

Here’s the scene. Large sandbox perhaps ten kids from the ages of one to  four years or so. There is a miscellaneous group of colorful plastic toys strewn across the sandbox. In most cases, these are toys that have accompanied the children who are in various stages of digging, dumping and pushing. Other toys may find the sandbox as their more or less permanent homes having been abandoned by children (and not accounted for by their parents) earlier in the day or last week. These orphans are ‘community’ toys for all to share- a utopian dream.

Upon arrival, what quickly happens is the shovel, bucket and truck that may have originally been contributed to the box all get dropped and swapped. At a minimum there are typically at least two toys for each child.’ Kid ‘A’ picks up Kid “B’s” shovel, Kid “C” takes the truck of Kid “D” and so on. No big deal. Everyone is playing and happy. Everyone had something to play with. Most have a short attention span and are easily distracted – this is where the inefficiency comes in.

Eventual someone figures out that one of the toys is more desirable than the others and a ‘market’ emerges. Barter or battle.

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